Decision rules revealing commonly known events

We provide a sufficient condition under which an uninformed principal can infer any information that is common knowledge among two experts, regardless of the structure of the parties’ beliefs. The condition requires that the bias of each expert is less than the radius of the smallest ball containing...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2013-04, Vol.119 (1), p.8-10
Main Authors: Mylovanov, Tymofiy, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency theory
Beliefs
Bias
Communication
Decision theory
Economic theory
Information management
Knowledge
Multi-sender cheap talk
Multidimensional cheap talk
Studies
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Summary:We provide a sufficient condition under which an uninformed principal can infer any information that is common knowledge among two experts, regardless of the structure of the parties’ beliefs. The condition requires that the bias of each expert is less than the radius of the smallest ball containing the action space. ► How to elicit information that is common knowledge among two experts? ► A simple sufficient condition on experts’ biases and the action space is provided. ► In some environments this condition is also necessary.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.002