An experiment on protecting intellectual property

We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether the protection of intellectual property (IP) incentivizes people to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, foregoing the production of other rivalrous goods. In the contrasting treatment with no IP protection, participants are free to resell and r...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association 2014-12, Vol.17 (4), p.691-716
Main Authors: Buchanan, Joy A., Wilson, Bart J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Economic models
Economic statistics
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurship
Experimental economics
Experiments
Game Theory
Incentives
Innovations
Intellectual property
Knowledge
Laboratories
Microeconomics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Production
Profit
Social and Behav. Sciences
Studies
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Summary:We conduct a laboratory experiment to explore whether the protection of intellectual property (IP) incentivizes people to create non-rivalrous knowledge goods, foregoing the production of other rivalrous goods. In the contrasting treatment with no IP protection, participants are free to resell and remake non-rivalrous knowledge goods originally created by others. We find that creators reap substantial profits when IP is protected and that rampant pirating is common when there is no IP protection, but IP protection in and of itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for generating wealth from the discovery of knowledge goods. Rather, individual entrepreneurship is the key.
ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-013-9390-8