INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL

We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative beha...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic inquiry 2015-01, Vol.53 (1), p.557-573
Main Authors: Greiff, Matthias, Paetzel, Fabian
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Behavioural psychology
Cooperation
Effectiveness studies
Endowments
Experimentation
Game theory
Hypothesis
Imperfect information
Information processing
Public good
Public goods
Social acceptance
Social approval
Social aspects
Social psychology
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Summary:We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned heterogeneous endowments, we test our model. The main hypothesis is that the expression of social approval increases cooperative behavior even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. The expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. (JEL C72, C91, D71, D83)
ISSN:0095-2583
1465-7295
DOI:10.1111/ecin.12134