Who I Am and How I Contract: The Effect of Contractors’ Roles on the Evolution of Contract Structure in University–Industry Research Agreements

In this exploratory study of university–industry sponsored research agreements, we investigate how organizational roles direct the relational learning of contracting personnel, which subsequently influences contract evolution. Integrating theory with comments from field interviews, we posit that as...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Organization science (Providence, R.I.) R.I.), 2014-11, Vol.25 (6), p.1840-1859
Main Authors: Bercovitz, Janet E. L., Tyler, Beverly B.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agreements
Alliances
Content analysis
contract evolution
Contract management
Contract negotiations
Contract provisions
Contractors
Contracts
Corporate strategies
Educational administration
Educational partnerships
Effects
Enforcement
Evaluation
Evolution
Governance
Human resources
Hypotheses
Hypothesis testing
Influence
Intellectual property
Investigations
Knowledge
Learning
Management
Monitoring
Organizational behaviour
Organizational learning
organizational roles
Organizational structure
Roles
sponsored research agreements
Studies
United States
Universities and colleges
University administration
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Summary:In this exploratory study of university–industry sponsored research agreements, we investigate how organizational roles direct the relational learning of contracting personnel, which subsequently influences contract evolution. Integrating theory with comments from field interviews, we posit that as scientists gain contracting experience with an exchange partner their focus of attention on knowledge creation supports the establishment of a relationship based on technical competence, behavioral experience, and operational routines that cause the enforcement terms of subsequent contracts to become less detailed. We also submit that contract administrators, because of their focus on knowledge protection (mitigating opportunism and enforcement), primarily accumulate joint governance experience and establish administrative routines that cause the enforcement terms of subsequent contracts to become more detailed. Rich content analysis of monitoring and intellectual property terms of sponsored research agreements supports our theoretically grounded hypotheses.
ISSN:1047-7039
1526-5455
DOI:10.1287/orsc.2014.0917