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HOW FIRMS RESPOND TO FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT: CEO SUCCESSORS AND EXTERNAL REACTIONS
Although past studies have paid considerable attention to firms' reputations, few have investigated the actions that firms take following a reputation-damaging event. We identify firms involved in financial earnings restatements and examine whether naming a successor CEO with specific qualities...
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Published in: | Academy of Management journal 2014-12, Vol.57 (6), p.1759-1785 |
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description | Although past studies have paid considerable attention to firms' reputations, few have investigated the actions that firms take following a reputation-damaging event. We identify firms involved in financial earnings restatements and examine whether naming a successor CEO with specific qualities serves to signal the seriousness of a firm's efforts to restore its reputation. Using theories of market signaling, we argue that attributes of successor CEOs significantly influence the reactions of key external constituencies. In particular, firms with more severe restatement tend to name successors who have prior CEO or turnaround experience and a more elite education. The naming of such successors results in more positive reactions from the stock market, financial analysts, and mass media. We argue that these attributes send messages to stakeholders and the broader public about the CEO's credibility and the firm's efforts. |
doi_str_mv | 10.5465/amj.2012.0491 |
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source | International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate【Trial: -2024/12/31】【Remote access available】; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
subjects | Analytical forecasting Business management Chief executive officers Earnings forecasting Education Finance Financial accounting Financial restatements Forecasting models Journalism Management theory Media Organizational behaviour Planning methods Public image management Reputation management Signalling Stakeholder Standard deviation Studies Succession planning |
title | HOW FIRMS RESPOND TO FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT: CEO SUCCESSORS AND EXTERNAL REACTIONS |
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