Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading

In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Environmental & resource economics 2015-01, Vol.60 (1), p.37-54
Main Authors: Helm, Carsten, Pichler, Stefan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Carbon emissions
Climate
Climate change
Climate policy
Deterioration
Developing countries
Economic models
Economic Policy
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Finance
Emissions
Emissions trading
Endowment
Environmental Economics
Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice
Environmental Management
Environmental policy
Incentives
LDCs
Mathematical models
Negotiations
Permits
Receiving
Studies
Subsidies
Subsidies (financial)
Technology transfer
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3
container_end_page 54
container_issue 1
container_start_page 37
container_title Environmental & resource economics
container_volume 60
creator Helm, Carsten
Pichler, Stefan
description In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries’ non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics.
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1654675584</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>1648072651</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNkU1LAzEQhoMoWKs_wNuCFy_RmSSbbPAkxS8o2EM9hzTJtlu2uzXZIv337lIPIgg9DTM878DMQ8g1wh0CqPuEIAVQQE61yiWVJ2SEueIUc2CnZASaCSqFhHNykdIaALQSckQeJnW1sV3IZm1duX32VXWrbB7cqmnrdrnP5tE2qQwxZbbx2SzETdUNQ181y0tyVto6haufOiYfz0_zySudvr-8TR6n1EnJOuoLLJxSViNqiyXCQvctFCIwzj3XufY-Lx1woVFxtvDCLTxn4EuuUZSWj8ntYe82tp-7kDqzqZILdW2b0O6SQZkLqfK8EMegyLUExo5ARQGKDYExufmDrttdbPqbe4prjsCZ6ik8UC62KcVQmm3sfxv3BsEMksxBkuklmUGSkX2GHTKpZ5tliL82_xv6BiMxkSg</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1639310327</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading</title><source>EconLit s plnými texty</source><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest)</source><source>Springer Link</source><creator>Helm, Carsten ; Pichler, Stefan</creator><creatorcontrib>Helm, Carsten ; Pichler, Stefan</creatorcontrib><description>In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries’ non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0924-6460</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1573-1502</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands</publisher><subject>Carbon emissions ; Climate ; Climate change ; Climate policy ; Deterioration ; Developing countries ; Economic models ; Economic Policy ; Economic theory ; Economics ; Economics and Finance ; Emissions ; Emissions trading ; Endowment ; Environmental Economics ; Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice ; Environmental Management ; Environmental policy ; Incentives ; LDCs ; Mathematical models ; Negotiations ; Permits ; Receiving ; Studies ; Subsidies ; Subsidies (financial) ; Technology transfer</subject><ispartof>Environmental &amp; resource economics, 2015-01, Vol.60 (1), p.37-54</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014</rights><rights>Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1639310327/fulltextPDF?pq-origsite=primo$$EPDF$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/1639310327?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,11686,12845,27922,27923,33221,33222,36058,36059,44361,74665</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Helm, Carsten</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pichler, Stefan</creatorcontrib><title>Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading</title><title>Environmental &amp; resource economics</title><addtitle>Environ Resource Econ</addtitle><description>In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries’ non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics.</description><subject>Carbon emissions</subject><subject>Climate</subject><subject>Climate change</subject><subject>Climate policy</subject><subject>Deterioration</subject><subject>Developing countries</subject><subject>Economic models</subject><subject>Economic Policy</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Economics</subject><subject>Economics and Finance</subject><subject>Emissions</subject><subject>Emissions trading</subject><subject>Endowment</subject><subject>Environmental Economics</subject><subject>Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice</subject><subject>Environmental Management</subject><subject>Environmental policy</subject><subject>Incentives</subject><subject>LDCs</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Negotiations</subject><subject>Permits</subject><subject>Receiving</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Subsidies</subject><subject>Subsidies (financial)</subject><subject>Technology transfer</subject><issn>0924-6460</issn><issn>1573-1502</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><sourceid>M0C</sourceid><recordid>eNqNkU1LAzEQhoMoWKs_wNuCFy_RmSSbbPAkxS8o2EM9hzTJtlu2uzXZIv337lIPIgg9DTM878DMQ8g1wh0CqPuEIAVQQE61yiWVJ2SEueIUc2CnZASaCSqFhHNykdIaALQSckQeJnW1sV3IZm1duX32VXWrbB7cqmnrdrnP5tE2qQwxZbbx2SzETdUNQ181y0tyVto6haufOiYfz0_zySudvr-8TR6n1EnJOuoLLJxSViNqiyXCQvctFCIwzj3XufY-Lx1woVFxtvDCLTxn4EuuUZSWj8ntYe82tp-7kDqzqZILdW2b0O6SQZkLqfK8EMegyLUExo5ARQGKDYExufmDrttdbPqbe4prjsCZ6ik8UC62KcVQmm3sfxv3BsEMksxBkuklmUGSkX2GHTKpZ5tliL82_xv6BiMxkSg</recordid><startdate>20150101</startdate><enddate>20150101</enddate><creator>Helm, Carsten</creator><creator>Pichler, Stefan</creator><general>Springer Netherlands</general><general>Springer Nature B.V</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>0U~</scope><scope>1-H</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7ST</scope><scope>7WY</scope><scope>7WZ</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>87Z</scope><scope>8AO</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8FL</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AEUYN</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>ATCPS</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BEZIV</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>BHPHI</scope><scope>C1K</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>FRNLG</scope><scope>F~G</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>JBE</scope><scope>K60</scope><scope>K6~</scope><scope>L.-</scope><scope>L.0</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M0C</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>PATMY</scope><scope>PQBIZ</scope><scope>PQBZA</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope><scope>PYCSY</scope><scope>Q9U</scope><scope>SOI</scope><scope>7SU</scope><scope>7TA</scope><scope>8FD</scope><scope>FR3</scope><scope>JG9</scope><scope>KR7</scope><scope>7TG</scope><scope>7U6</scope><scope>KL.</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20150101</creationdate><title>Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading</title><author>Helm, Carsten ; Pichler, Stefan</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Carbon emissions</topic><topic>Climate</topic><topic>Climate change</topic><topic>Climate policy</topic><topic>Deterioration</topic><topic>Developing countries</topic><topic>Economic models</topic><topic>Economic Policy</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Economics</topic><topic>Economics and Finance</topic><topic>Emissions</topic><topic>Emissions trading</topic><topic>Endowment</topic><topic>Environmental Economics</topic><topic>Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice</topic><topic>Environmental Management</topic><topic>Environmental policy</topic><topic>Incentives</topic><topic>LDCs</topic><topic>Mathematical models</topic><topic>Negotiations</topic><topic>Permits</topic><topic>Receiving</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Subsidies</topic><topic>Subsidies (financial)</topic><topic>Technology transfer</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Helm, Carsten</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Pichler, Stefan</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Global News &amp; ABI/Inform Professional</collection><collection>Trade PRO</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>ProQuest_ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Pharma Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Materials Science &amp; Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Sustainability</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Agricultural &amp; Environmental Science Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Premium Collection</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Natural Science Collection</collection><collection>Environmental Sciences and Pollution Management</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>Business Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Business Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Advanced</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Professional Standard</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest)</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Environmental Science Database</collection><collection>One Business (ProQuest)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Business (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Environmental Science Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><collection>Environment Abstracts</collection><collection>Environmental Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Materials Business File</collection><collection>Technology Research Database</collection><collection>Engineering Research Database</collection><collection>Materials Research Database</collection><collection>Civil Engineering Abstracts</collection><collection>Meteorological &amp; Geoastrophysical Abstracts</collection><collection>Sustainability Science Abstracts</collection><collection>Meteorological &amp; Geoastrophysical Abstracts - Academic</collection><jtitle>Environmental &amp; resource economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Helm, Carsten</au><au>Pichler, Stefan</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading</atitle><jtitle>Environmental &amp; resource economics</jtitle><stitle>Environ Resource Econ</stitle><date>2015-01-01</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>60</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>37</spage><epage>54</epage><pages>37-54</pages><issn>0924-6460</issn><eissn>1573-1502</eissn><abstract>In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries’ non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics.</abstract><cop>Dordrecht</cop><pub>Springer Netherlands</pub><doi>10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6</doi><tpages>18</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0924-6460
ispartof Environmental & resource economics, 2015-01, Vol.60 (1), p.37-54
issn 0924-6460
1573-1502
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1654675584
source EconLit s plnými texty; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest); Springer Link
subjects Carbon emissions
Climate
Climate change
Climate policy
Deterioration
Developing countries
Economic models
Economic Policy
Economic theory
Economics
Economics and Finance
Emissions
Emissions trading
Endowment
Environmental Economics
Environmental Law/Policy/Ecojustice
Environmental Management
Environmental policy
Incentives
LDCs
Mathematical models
Negotiations
Permits
Receiving
Studies
Subsidies
Subsidies (financial)
Technology transfer
title Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-14T12%3A47%3A39IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Climate%20Policy%20with%20Technology%20Transfers%20and%20Permit%20Trading&rft.jtitle=Environmental%20&%20resource%20economics&rft.au=Helm,%20Carsten&rft.date=2015-01-01&rft.volume=60&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=37&rft.epage=54&rft.pages=37-54&rft.issn=0924-6460&rft.eissn=1573-1502&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/s10640-013-9756-6&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E1648072651%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c662t-d818c77a9119a1f10b9c77084e233d3959dd5fc03491732bd4cbd320df3914fa3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1639310327&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true