An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory

This article uses a laboratory experiment to test one of the main predictions of selectorate theory, that is, that democratic leaders invest more resources in public goods than autocratic leaders. The results of the experiment confirm this prediction and further show citizens are better off on avera...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International interactions 2014-08, Vol.40 (4), p.533-553
Main Author: Bausch, Andrew W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Autarchy
Citizens
Conflict
Democracy
Efficiency
experiment
Experiments
formal modeling
Games
International Relations
Political leaders
Political leadership
Prediction
Public good
Public goods
selectorate theory
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Summary:This article uses a laboratory experiment to test one of the main predictions of selectorate theory, that is, that democratic leaders invest more resources in public goods than autocratic leaders. The results of the experiment confirm this prediction and further show citizens are better off on average under democratic institutions than autocratic institutions. Meanwhile, autocratic leaders receive higher payoffs than democratic leaders. Additionally, this article attempts to bring domestic politics into international relations experimentation with a focus on how communication may allow democracies to organize more efficiently for war than autocracies. A game theoretical model shows democracies have the potential to organize optimally and use their citizens' skills to their full advantage while autocracies do not. The results of the experiment reveal some evidence that democracies organize more efficiently than autocracies, but that this increased efficiency did not produce a higher percentage of conflict wins.
ISSN:0305-0629
1547-7444
DOI:10.1080/03050629.2014.891997