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An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory

This article uses a laboratory experiment to test one of the main predictions of selectorate theory, that is, that democratic leaders invest more resources in public goods than autocratic leaders. The results of the experiment confirm this prediction and further show citizens are better off on avera...

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Published in:	International interactions 2014-08, Vol.40 (4), p.533-553
Main Author:	Bausch, Andrew W.
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Subjects:	Autarchy Citizens Conflict Democracy Efficiency experiment Experiments formal modeling Games International Relations Political leaders Political leadership Prediction Public good Public goods selectorate theory
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description	This article uses a laboratory experiment to test one of the main predictions of selectorate theory, that is, that democratic leaders invest more resources in public goods than autocratic leaders. The results of the experiment confirm this prediction and further show citizens are better off on average under democratic institutions than autocratic institutions. Meanwhile, autocratic leaders receive higher payoffs than democratic leaders. Additionally, this article attempts to bring domestic politics into international relations experimentation with a focus on how communication may allow democracies to organize more efficiently for war than autocracies. A game theoretical model shows democracies have the potential to organize optimally and use their citizens' skills to their full advantage while autocracies do not. The results of the experiment reveal some evidence that democracies organize more efficiently than autocracies, but that this increased efficiency did not produce a higher percentage of conflict wins.
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source	International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate; Taylor & Francis; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
subjects	Autarchy Citizens Conflict Democracy Efficiency experiment Experiments formal modeling Games International Relations Political leaders Political leadership Prediction Public good Public goods selectorate theory
title	An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory
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