If I imagine it, then it happened: The Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

• Published in: Cognition 2014-12, Vol.133 (3), p.517-529
• Main Authors: Shidlovski, Daniella, Schul, Yaacov, Mayo, Ruth
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Association; Autobiographical implicit association test; Autobiography; Biological and medical sciences; Characterology; Cognition. Intelligence; Deceit; Emotions - physiology; Evaluation; Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology; Humans; Imagination; Imagination - physiology; Judgment - physiology; Miscellaneous; Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry; Psychology. Psychophysiology; Thinking - physiology; Truth; Truth value
• ISSN: 0010-0277; 1873-7838
• DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.005

•Implicit Truth Value (ITV) is a spontaneous evaluation of truth.•It may differ from beliefs about the events’ veracity (Explicit Truth Value, ETV).•ITV is tested using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT).•Imagining an event enhances its ITV even when one acknowledges the event as false.•Perspective of imagination (first vs. third person) influences ITV but not ETV. Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.