Institutional change and continuity in the European Union: The super-commissioner saga

We analyse the politics surrounding the proposal to create a super-commissioner with exclusive powers to veto national budgets in the European Union (EU). According to liberal institutionalism and liberal inter-governmentalism, there should be no need for a super-commissioner to enforce inter-govern...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Acta politica 2014-04, Vol.49 (2), p.174-195
Main Authors: Karagiannis, Yannis, Guidi, Mattia
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budgets
Coalitions
Commissions
Comparative Politics
Contracts
Economic models
Europe
European Commission
European Politics
European Union
Institutionalism
International Organizations
Narratives
Original Article
Political Science
Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Studies
Politics
Power
Presidents
Sovereign debt
Veto
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Summary:We analyse the politics surrounding the proposal to create a super-commissioner with exclusive powers to veto national budgets in the European Union (EU). According to liberal institutionalism and liberal inter-governmentalism, there should be no need for a super-commissioner to enforce inter-governmental agreements, because the European Commission (the Commission) is already doing this. So, is the super-commissioner superfluous, or is the theory wrong? To answer this question, we build an analytic narrative aimed at clarifying who wanted what and why, and at explaining how a relatively small coalition of northern creditor-nation governments almost succeeded in amending the EU’s core constitutional principle of executive-level collegiality by threatening to select an altogether different institution. Our findings bear significance not only for current policy debates, but also for our appreciation of the institutional equilibria that sustain the EU, and on the theory of institutional change in international organizations.
ISSN:0001-6810
1741-1416
DOI:10.1057/ap.2013.21