Selfish routing in public services

•A connection is made between public service choice and routing games.•Theoretical results are obtained as to the effect of demand and worth of service.•In general a public service system should expect a high price of anarchy.•The above ideas are demonstrated with a large scale real world case study...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal of operational research 2013-10, Vol.230 (1), p.122-132
Main Authors: Knight, Vincent A., Harper, Paul R.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Congestion
Decision analysis
Decisions
Demand
Economics
Game theory
Health care
Location analysis
Marketing
Operational research
OR in health services
Public administration
Public policy
Public services
Queueing theory
Queues
Queuing theory
Studies
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Summary:•A connection is made between public service choice and routing games.•Theoretical results are obtained as to the effect of demand and worth of service.•In general a public service system should expect a high price of anarchy.•The above ideas are demonstrated with a large scale real world case study. It is well observed that individual behaviour can have an effect on the efficiency of queueing systems. The impact of this behaviour on the economic efficiency of public services is considered in this paper where we present results concerning the congestion related implications of decisions made by individuals when choosing between facilities. The work presented has important managerial implications at a public policy level when considering the effect of allowing individuals to choose between providers. We show that in general the introduction of choice in an already inefficient system will not have a negative effect. Introducing choice in a system that copes with demand will have a negative effect.
ISSN:0377-2217
1872-6860
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2013.04.003