The Geography of Ethnocentrism

Hammond and Axelrod use an evolutionary agent-based model to explore the development of ethnocentrism. They argue that local interactions permit groups, relying on in-group favoritism, to overcome the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma and sustain in-group cooperation. This article show...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Journal of conflict resolution 2015-04, Vol.59 (3), p.510-527
Main Author: Bausch, Andrew W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cooperation
Ethnocentrism
Game theory
Geography
Group dynamics
Nash equilibrium
Prisoner's dilemma
Social interaction
Studies
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3
container_end_page 527
container_issue 3
container_start_page 510
container_title The Journal of conflict resolution
container_volume 59
creator Bausch, Andrew W.
description Hammond and Axelrod use an evolutionary agent-based model to explore the development of ethnocentrism. They argue that local interactions permit groups, relying on in-group favoritism, to overcome the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma and sustain in-group cooperation. This article shows that higher levels of cooperation evolve when groups are dropped from the model, breaking the link between ethnocentrism and cooperation. This article then generalizes Hammond and Axelrod's model by parameterizing the underlying geographical assumptions they make about the evolutionary environment. This more general model shows that their findings are sensitive to these assumptions and that small changes to the assumed geography of reproduction significantly affect the probabilities of finding "ethnocentric" behaviors. The model presented here indicates that it is not local interactions, per se, but settings where interactions are highly likely to be with close relatives that lead to "ethnocentrism" as modeled by Hammond and Axelrod.
doi_str_mv 10.1177/0022002713515401
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1672875776</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>24546265</jstor_id><sage_id>10.1177_0022002713515401</sage_id><sourcerecordid>24546265</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp1kM1LAzEQxYMoWKt3L0rBi5fVycck2aOUWoWCl3pe0mzS3dJuarI99L93lxWRgodhBt7vPYZHyC2FJ0qVegZgrBtFOVIUQM_IiCKyTCspz8mol7NevyRXKW0A-htG5H5ZucnchXU0--o4CX4ya6smWNe0sU67a3LhzTa5m589Jp-vs-X0LVt8zN-nL4vMcinazAqFjOlSlMBXRiN6oVGLVUnBi5XKbW60BxSWcp0rJnWO4EvHaMlYSbnjY_I45O5j-Dq41Ba7Olm33ZrGhUMqqFRMK1RKdujDCboJh9h033WUhJxzAN5RMFA2hpSi88U-1jsTjwWFoi-sOC2ss2SDJZm1-xP6P3838JvUhvibzwQKySTybwKSb8E</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>1660933003</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>The Geography of Ethnocentrism</title><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>SAGE</source><creator>Bausch, Andrew W.</creator><creatorcontrib>Bausch, Andrew W.</creatorcontrib><description>Hammond and Axelrod use an evolutionary agent-based model to explore the development of ethnocentrism. They argue that local interactions permit groups, relying on in-group favoritism, to overcome the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma and sustain in-group cooperation. This article shows that higher levels of cooperation evolve when groups are dropped from the model, breaking the link between ethnocentrism and cooperation. This article then generalizes Hammond and Axelrod's model by parameterizing the underlying geographical assumptions they make about the evolutionary environment. This more general model shows that their findings are sensitive to these assumptions and that small changes to the assumed geography of reproduction significantly affect the probabilities of finding "ethnocentric" behaviors. The model presented here indicates that it is not local interactions, per se, but settings where interactions are highly likely to be with close relatives that lead to "ethnocentrism" as modeled by Hammond and Axelrod.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-0027</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1552-8766</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/0022002713515401</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JCFRAL</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications</publisher><subject>Cooperation ; Ethnocentrism ; Game theory ; Geography ; Group dynamics ; Nash equilibrium ; Prisoner's dilemma ; Social interaction ; Studies</subject><ispartof>The Journal of conflict resolution, 2015-04, Vol.59 (3), p.510-527</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2015 SAGE Publications</rights><rights>The Author(s) 2014</rights><rights>Copyright SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. Apr 2015</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24546265$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/24546265$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,27924,27925,33223,33224,58238,58471,79236</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bausch, Andrew W.</creatorcontrib><title>The Geography of Ethnocentrism</title><title>The Journal of conflict resolution</title><description>Hammond and Axelrod use an evolutionary agent-based model to explore the development of ethnocentrism. They argue that local interactions permit groups, relying on in-group favoritism, to overcome the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma and sustain in-group cooperation. This article shows that higher levels of cooperation evolve when groups are dropped from the model, breaking the link between ethnocentrism and cooperation. This article then generalizes Hammond and Axelrod's model by parameterizing the underlying geographical assumptions they make about the evolutionary environment. This more general model shows that their findings are sensitive to these assumptions and that small changes to the assumed geography of reproduction significantly affect the probabilities of finding "ethnocentric" behaviors. The model presented here indicates that it is not local interactions, per se, but settings where interactions are highly likely to be with close relatives that lead to "ethnocentrism" as modeled by Hammond and Axelrod.</description><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Ethnocentrism</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Geography</subject><subject>Group dynamics</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Prisoner's dilemma</subject><subject>Social interaction</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0022-0027</issn><issn>1552-8766</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2015</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNp1kM1LAzEQxYMoWKt3L0rBi5fVycck2aOUWoWCl3pe0mzS3dJuarI99L93lxWRgodhBt7vPYZHyC2FJ0qVegZgrBtFOVIUQM_IiCKyTCspz8mol7NevyRXKW0A-htG5H5ZucnchXU0--o4CX4ya6smWNe0sU67a3LhzTa5m589Jp-vs-X0LVt8zN-nL4vMcinazAqFjOlSlMBXRiN6oVGLVUnBi5XKbW60BxSWcp0rJnWO4EvHaMlYSbnjY_I45O5j-Dq41Ba7Olm33ZrGhUMqqFRMK1RKdujDCboJh9h033WUhJxzAN5RMFA2hpSi88U-1jsTjwWFoi-sOC2ss2SDJZm1-xP6P3838JvUhvibzwQKySTybwKSb8E</recordid><startdate>20150401</startdate><enddate>20150401</enddate><creator>Bausch, Andrew W.</creator><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20150401</creationdate><title>The Geography of Ethnocentrism</title><author>Bausch, Andrew W.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2015</creationdate><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Ethnocentrism</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Geography</topic><topic>Group dynamics</topic><topic>Nash equilibrium</topic><topic>Prisoner's dilemma</topic><topic>Social interaction</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bausch, Andrew W.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Journal of conflict resolution</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bausch, Andrew W.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>The Geography of Ethnocentrism</atitle><jtitle>The Journal of conflict resolution</jtitle><date>2015-04-01</date><risdate>2015</risdate><volume>59</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>510</spage><epage>527</epage><pages>510-527</pages><issn>0022-0027</issn><eissn>1552-8766</eissn><coden>JCFRAL</coden><abstract>Hammond and Axelrod use an evolutionary agent-based model to explore the development of ethnocentrism. They argue that local interactions permit groups, relying on in-group favoritism, to overcome the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma and sustain in-group cooperation. This article shows that higher levels of cooperation evolve when groups are dropped from the model, breaking the link between ethnocentrism and cooperation. This article then generalizes Hammond and Axelrod's model by parameterizing the underlying geographical assumptions they make about the evolutionary environment. This more general model shows that their findings are sensitive to these assumptions and that small changes to the assumed geography of reproduction significantly affect the probabilities of finding "ethnocentric" behaviors. The model presented here indicates that it is not local interactions, per se, but settings where interactions are highly likely to be with close relatives that lead to "ethnocentrism" as modeled by Hammond and Axelrod.</abstract><cop>Los Angeles, CA</cop><pub>SAGE Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/0022002713515401</doi><tpages>18</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0022-0027
ispartof The Journal of conflict resolution, 2015-04, Vol.59 (3), p.510-527
issn 0022-0027
1552-8766
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_1672875776
source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); JSTOR Archival Journals and Primary Sources Collection; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; SAGE
subjects Cooperation
Ethnocentrism
Game theory
Geography
Group dynamics
Nash equilibrium
Prisoner's dilemma
Social interaction
Studies
title The Geography of Ethnocentrism
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-08T01%3A55%3A36IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The%20Geography%20of%20Ethnocentrism&rft.jtitle=The%20Journal%20of%20conflict%20resolution&rft.au=Bausch,%20Andrew%20W.&rft.date=2015-04-01&rft.volume=59&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=510&rft.epage=527&rft.pages=510-527&rft.issn=0022-0027&rft.eissn=1552-8766&rft.coden=JCFRAL&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177/0022002713515401&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E24546265%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c364t-c475228d4d03ba855f48584bd10f4b79c9a8f054c13897268950fde21d22d13e3%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=1660933003&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=24546265&rft_sage_id=10.1177_0022002713515401&rfr_iscdi=true