Values and coalition configurations

In this paper we consider coalition configurations (Albizuri et al. in Games Econ Behav 57:1–17,  2006 ), that is, families of coalitions not necessarily disjoint whose union is the grand coalition, and give a generalization of the Shapley value (Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton Un...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Mathematical methods of operations research (Heidelberg, Germany) Germany), 2015-02, Vol.81 (1), p.3-26
Main Authors: Albizuri, M. Josune, Vidal-Puga, Juan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Associations
Business and Management
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control
Optimization
Coalitions
Economics
Game theory
Games
Mathematical analysis
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Operations research
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Article
Presses
Studies
Unions
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Summary:In this paper we consider coalition configurations (Albizuri et al. in Games Econ Behav 57:1–17,  2006 ), that is, families of coalitions not necessarily disjoint whose union is the grand coalition, and give a generalization of the Shapley value (Contributions to the theory of games II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317,  1953 ) and the Owen value (Essays in mathematical economics and game theory, Springer, Berlin, pp 76–88,  1977 ) when coalition configurations form. This will be an alternative definition to the one given by Albizuri et al.
ISSN:1432-2994
1432-5217
DOI:10.1007/s00186-014-0484-7