Voter information and electoral outcomes: the Norwegian list of shame

This paper studies the effect on vote shares and reelection probability for the incumbent's party from a signal indicating poor fiscal performance. In Norway, local governments with persistent deficits are placed in the Register for State Review and Approval of Financial Obligations (Robek). In...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2014-10, Vol.161 (1/2), p.233-255
Main Author: Hopland, Arnt O.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budget deficits
Budgets
Central Government
Decentralization
Democracy
Economics
Economics and Finance
Election results
Elections
Electoral behaviour
Electoral College
Electoral fraud
Electoral law
Federal government
Fiscal policy
Government budgets
Incumbency
Incumbents
International
Local elections
Local Government
Management science
Mayors
Norway
Obligation
Performance evaluation
Political parties
Political Science
Politicians
Politics
Probability
Public Finance
Reelection
Shame
State elections
Studies
Transparency
Vote transfer
Voter behavior
Voter registration
Voters
Voting
Voting behaviour
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Summary:This paper studies the effect on vote shares and reelection probability for the incumbent's party from a signal indicating poor fiscal performance. In Norway, local governments with persistent deficits are placed in the Register for State Review and Approval of Financial Obligations (Robek). In addition to increased central government monitoring, placement in Robek triggers a great deal of attention in the local media. It is thus expected to raise voter awareness of the fiscal stance of the local government. The results indicate that voters value the information embedded in this signal, and take it into account when casting their votes. Both the share of votes for the incumbent's party and the probability that the incumbent party stays in office is significantly reduced as a consequence of the local government being included in the register. The vote share for the incumbent is reduced by about three percentage points, while the reelection probability is reduced by about 0.12.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101
DOI:10.1007/s11127-014-0151-9