HOUSEHOLD INTERACTION AND THE LABOR SUPPLY OF MARRIED WOMEN

Are changing social norms affecting the employment rates of women? A model is built in which the employment of husbands and wives is the outcome of potentially exogenously determined three different types of household games: the Classical household, where the spouses play a Stackelberg leader game i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International economic review (Philadelphia) 2015-05, Vol.56 (2), p.427-455
Main Authors: Eckstein, Zvi, Lifshitz, Osnat
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Dual career couples
Economic models
Employment
Game theory
Households
Labor supply
Labour supply
Married women
Nash equilibrium
Social norms
Studies
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Summary:Are changing social norms affecting the employment rates of women? A model is built in which the employment of husbands and wives is the outcome of potentially exogenously determined three different types of household games: the Classical household, where the spouses play a Stackelberg leader game in which the wife's labor supply decision is based on her husband's employment outcome; the Modern household, which is characterized by a symmetric and simultaneous game solved as a Nash equilibrium, and the Cooperative household, where the couple jointly maximizes the weighted sum of their utilities. In all models, husbands' employment is similar whereas wives work much less in Classical households.
ISSN:0020-6598
1468-2354
DOI:10.1111/iere.12110