World Health Organization Guidelines for Containment of Poliovirus Following Type-Specific Polio Eradication — Worldwide, 2015

• Published in: MMWR. Morbidity and mortality weekly report 2015-08, Vol.64 (33), p.913-917
• Main Authors: Previsani, Nicoletta, Tangermann, Rudolph H., Tallis, Graham, Jafari, Hamid S.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Computer organization; Containment of Biohazards; Disease Eradication; Global Health; Guidelines as Topic; Humans; Poliomyelitis; Poliomyelitis - prevention & control; Poliovirus - classification; Poliovirus Vaccine, Oral - administration & dosage; Practice guidelines (Medicine); Public health; World Health Organization
• ISSN: 0149-2195; 1545-861X
• DOI: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6433a5

In 1988, the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization (WHO) resolved to eradicate polio worldwide. Among the three wild poliovirus (WPV) types (type 1, type 2, and type 3), WPV type 2 (WPV2) has been eliminated in the wild since 1999, and WPV type 3 (WPV3) has not been reported since 2012. In 2015, only Afghanistan and Pakistan have reported WPV transmission. On May 25, 2015, all WHO Member States endorsed World Health Assembly resolution 68.3 on full implementation of the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 (the Endgame Plan), and with it, the third Global Action Plan to minimize poliovirus facility-associated risk (GAPIII). All WHO Member States have committed to implementing appropriate containment of WPV2 in essential laboratory and vaccine production facilities* by the end of 2015 and of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) within 3 months of global withdrawal of OPV2, which is planned for April 2016. This report summarizes critical steps for essential laboratory and vaccine production facilities that intend to retain materials confirmed to contain or potentially containing type-specific WPV, vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV), or OPV/Sabin viruses, and steps for nonessential facilities† that process specimens that contain or might contain polioviruses. National authorities will need to certify that the essential facilities they host meet the containment requirements described in GAPIII. After certification of WPV eradication, the use of all OPV will cease; final containment of all polioviruses after polio eradication and OPV cessation will minimize the risk for reintroduction of poliovirus into a polio-free world.