An incentive-based mechanism for fair bidirectional transmissions in wireless mesh networks

The previous studies almost focus on the fairness problem of the uplink traffic in wireless mesh networks. This paper studies the fairness problem for bidirectional traffic in multi-hop wireless mesh networks containing selfish nodes. Unlike the transmission of uplink traffic, where transit packets...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Computers & electrical engineering 2015-01, Vol.41, p.342-356
Main Author: Chuang, Ming-Chin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bidirectional
Computer simulation
Finite element method
Networks
Strategy
Traffic engineering
Traffic flow
Transit
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The previous studies almost focus on the fairness problem of the uplink traffic in wireless mesh networks. This paper studies the fairness problem for bidirectional traffic in multi-hop wireless mesh networks containing selfish nodes. Unlike the transmission of uplink traffic, where transit packets are dropped at intermediate Transit Access Points (TAPs), almost all downlink traffic is dropped at the gateway. To resolve the problem, this paper presents an incentive-based mechanism (IBM) under which the optimal strategies of selfish TAPs and the gateway are the corresponding actions that enforce fairness. Moreover, this paper formulates the target throughput of each TAP in the network, proves the feasibility of the target throughputs for the uplink and downlink traffic of each TAP, and uses IBM to ensure that all selfish TAPs and the gateway follow the fairness model truthfully. Finally, the simulation results show that the proposed mechanisms are accurate and truthful.
ISSN:0045-7906
1879-0755
DOI:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2014.03.004