Sanctioning in the Wild: Rational Calculus and Retributive Instincts in Gourmet Cuisine

Why do we sanction norm violations? Despite near universal agreement on the role of sanctions for maintaining norms of cooperation, scholars hotly dispute whether individuals sanction based on a rational calculus or because of strong retributive instincts. In this paper we report on a mixed-method f...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Academy of Management journal 2015-06, Vol.58 (3), p.906-931
Main Authors: Di Stefano, Giada, King, Andrew A., Verona, Gianmario
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Chefs
Cooperation
Cost-benefit analysis
Economic sanctions
Hypothesis
Italy
Management science
Qualitative analysis
Sanctions
Social interaction
Studies
Violations
Western Europe
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Summary:Why do we sanction norm violations? Despite near universal agreement on the role of sanctions for maintaining norms of cooperation, scholars hotly dispute whether individuals sanction based on a rational calculus or because of strong retributive instincts. In this paper we report on a mixed-method field study examining sanctioning behavior. Our goal is to extend theories of sanctioning by evaluating the conditions under which individuals are more likely to administer a sanction in response to a norm violation. To guide the development of our hypotheses, we engage in a qualitative examination of sanctioning decisions in the context of gourmet cuisine. We then test our predictions in a field experiment involving more than 500 gourmet chefs in Italy. Our results suggest that individuals follow retributive instincts, but they also engage in cost-benefit calculations. Indeed, we find that the two logics of sanctioning jointly influence participation in social exchange. Recognizing their own tendency to sanction at a cost, individuals avoid circumstances that could trigger the need for costly sanctions.
ISSN:0001-4273
1948-0989
DOI:10.5465/amj.2012.1192