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Agonistic behavior in wild male Magellanic penguins : when and how do they interact?

Game-theory models predict that the frequency and type of agonistic interactions should vary with the value of the resource being contested. We describe bill duels and overt fighting in male Magellanic penguins (Spheniscus magellanicus) at a breeding colony and determine whether these behaviors chan...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of ethology 2006-04, Vol.24 (2), p.189-193
Main Authors: RENISON, Daniel, BOERSMA, P. Dee, VAN BUREN, Amy N, MARTELLA, Monica B
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Game-theory models predict that the frequency and type of agonistic interactions should vary with the value of the resource being contested. We describe bill duels and overt fighting in male Magellanic penguins (Spheniscus magellanicus) at a breeding colony and determine whether these behaviors change with the value of the nests over which they interact. Bill duels represent low levels of aggression while overt fighting high levels of aggression. Consistent with predictions, overt fighting was more common before egg laying when nests have the highest potential value while bill duels were more common at failed nests later in the season when nests are less valuable as they could not be used for reproduction until the next season. Contrary to expectations, overt fights were shorter and resulted in fewer cuts before egg laying than after egg laying. Large size asymmetries between opponents before egg laying may enable losers to quickly assess their opponents and leave before they are hurt. As predicted, the duration and damage occurring during overt fights were positively correlated with nest cover, which is correlated with higher reproductive success. We conclude that male Magellanic penguins have rules of engagement that in the most cases follow game-theory predictions on when and how to interact.
ISSN:0289-0771
1439-5444
DOI:10.1007/s10164-005-0180-4