Visions of Judgment: Arendt, Kant, and the Misreading of Judgment

Hannah Arendt's conceptualization of judgment may only drive political theorists further from the phenomenon. Throughout her life, Arendt's work on judgment was guided by Kant's thought. Arendt's reading of Kant's work raises two difficulties to which contemporary political...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political research quarterly 2013-06, Vol.66 (2), p.254-266
Main Author: Weidenfeld, Matthew C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Aesthetic judgment
Arendt, Hannah
Arendt, Hannah, 1906-75
Common sense
Concept Formation
Conceptualization
Intuition
Judgement
Judgment
Kant, Immanuel
Moral judgment
Phenomena
Pleasure
Political philosophy
Political science
Political Scientists
Political theory
Political thought
Rationalism
Reading
Spectators
Viewers
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Summary:Hannah Arendt's conceptualization of judgment may only drive political theorists further from the phenomenon. Throughout her life, Arendt's work on judgment was guided by Kant's thought. Arendt's reading of Kant's work raises two difficulties to which contemporary political scientists should attend. First, Arendt's reading of Kant is a systematic misreading of his texts. Second, Arendt's misreading of Kant pushes her toward a misreading of the phenomenon of judgment. More important, Arendt's misreading has led political theorists to assume a divide between the points of view of the actor and of the spectator, which cannot be reconciled given the resources of Arendt's thought.
ISSN:1065-9129
1938-274X
DOI:10.1177/1065912912446228