International Treaty Ratification and Party Competition: Theory and Evidence from the EU's Constitutional Treaty

What explains a party's dual decision about whether to endorse a referendum on an international treaty and whether to support that treaty in a referendum campaign? Relying on an original game of second-order electoral competition, this article argues that the relative likelihood of a party endo...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Political science research and methods 2013-12, Vol.1 (2), p.179-200
Main Authors: Dür, Andreas, Konstantinidis, Nikitas
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Competition
Constitutional law
Direct democracy
Elections
Electoral College
European integration
Expectations
Games
International organizations
Logistics
Opposition parties
Original Articles
Parliaments
Political Campaigns
Political parties
Public opinion
Public Support
Ratification
Referendum
Referendums
Treaties
Treaties Ratification
Voter behavior
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Summary:What explains a party's dual decision about whether to endorse a referendum on an international treaty and whether to support that treaty in a referendum campaign? Relying on an original game of second-order electoral competition, this article argues that the relative likelihood of a party endorsing a referendum is highest at the beginning and end of the electoral cycle, and when the public supports the treaty. The study uses data on the position of 175 parties in 24 member states vis-à-vis the EU's Constitutional Treaty and its preferred mechanism of ratification to test these expectations against empirical evidence. Using a multinomial logistic regression model, it finds robust support for the argument.
ISSN:2049-8470
2049-8489
DOI:10.1017/psrm.2013.17