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Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data. We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and inte...
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Published in: | ACM transactions on computer systems 2015-09, Vol.33 (3), p.1-26 |
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container_title | ACM transactions on computer systems |
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creator | Baumann, Andrew Peinado, Marcus Hunt, Galen |
description | Today’s cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider’s staff and its globally distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data.
We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, and also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1145/2799647 |
format | article |
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subjects | Cloud computing Commodities Computer platforms Cybersecurity Hardware Integrity Legacy Operating systems Platforms Prototypes Specifications Structured Query Language-SQL Studies |
title | Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven |
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