Laplaceanism defended

This work is a critical consideration of several arguments recently given by Elliott Sober that are aimed at undermining the Laplacean stance on probability in evolutionary theory (and, by extension, the special sciences more broadly). The Laplacean contends that the only objective probability an ev...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Biology & philosophy 2016-05, Vol.31 (3), p.395-408
Main Author: Gildenhuys, Peter
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Education
Evolution
Evolutionary Biology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Biology
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Summary:This work is a critical consideration of several arguments recently given by Elliott Sober that are aimed at undermining the Laplacean stance on probability in evolutionary theory (and, by extension, the special sciences more broadly). The Laplacean contends that the only objective probability an event has is the one assigned to it by a complete description of the relevant microparticles. Sober alleges a formal demonstration that the Laplacean stance on probability in evolutionary theory is inconsistent. But Sober’s argument contains a crucial lacuna, one that likely cannot be repaired to yield the conclusion that Sober draws. He also argues that the Laplacean is committed to inferring semantic facts about probabilities from pragmatic facts about agents’ reasons for using probabilities. But Sober’s arguments against inferring semantic facts from pragmatic constraints would only undermine one basis for Laplaceanism. The Laplacean who formulates her position carefully need not leave herself vulnerable to Sober’s objection to inferring semantics from pragmatics.
ISSN:0169-3867
1572-8404
DOI:10.1007/s10539-016-9518-2