Is there an exemplar theory of concepts?

It is common to describe two main theories of concepts: prototype theories, which rely on some form of summary description of a category, and exemplar theories, which claim that concepts are represented as remembered category instances. This article reviews a number of important phenomena in the psy...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Psychonomic bulletin & review 2016-08, Vol.23 (4), p.1035-1042
Main Author: Murphy, Gregory L.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Behavioral Science and Psychology
Brief Report
Classification
Cognitive Psychology
Concept Formation
Experiments
Humans
Judgment
Learning
Memory
Mental Recall
Psychological Theory
Psychology
Textbooks
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Summary:It is common to describe two main theories of concepts: prototype theories, which rely on some form of summary description of a category, and exemplar theories, which claim that concepts are represented as remembered category instances. This article reviews a number of important phenomena in the psychology of concepts, arguing that they have no proposed exemplar explanation. In some of these cases, it is difficult to see how an exemplar theory would be adequate. The article concludes that exemplars are certainly important in some categorization judgments and in category-learning experiments, but that there is no exemplar theory of human concepts in a broad sense.
ISSN:1069-9384
1531-5320
DOI:10.3758/s13423-015-0834-3