Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decre...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2016-08, Vol.106 (8), p.2371-2405
Main Authors: Bobonis, Gustavo J., Fuertes, Luis R. Cámara, Schwabe, Rainer
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Accountability
Auditing
Audits
Behavior
Comptrollers
Corruption in government
Election results
Elections
Incentives
Local elections
Moral hazard
Municipal government
Politicians
Politics
Puerto Rico
Rent-seeking
Shorter Papers
Studies
Voters
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Summary:Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments.
ISSN:0002-8282
1944-7981
DOI:10.1257/aer.20130874