Egalitarian solutions to multiperson social dilemmas in populations

We consider a class of multiperson social dilemma games played in large populations. In particular, the popular games, such as for example the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Public Goods, the Tragedy of the Commons, the Volunteer’s Dilemma, and the Assurance game, are included in the proposed fram...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Applied mathematics and computation 2016-07, Vol.284, p.226-233
Main Author: Platkowski, Tadeusz
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Assurance
Coalitions formation
Cooperation
Evolution
Evolutionary games
Frames
Games
Mathematical analysis
Mathematical models
Multiperson social dilemma games
Populations
Replicator dynamics
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Summary:We consider a class of multiperson social dilemma games played in large populations. In particular, the popular games, such as for example the N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Public Goods, the Tragedy of the Commons, the Volunteer’s Dilemma, and the Assurance game, are included in the proposed frame. The evolution of such populations is assumed to be governed by the replicator equations. We show that the egalitarian distribution of the social welfare generated in the multiperson social dilemma games fosters the long run cooperation in such populations.
ISSN:0096-3003
1873-5649
DOI:10.1016/j.amc.2016.03.011