A fundamental study for partially defined cooperative games

The payoff of each coalition has been assumed to be known precisely in the conventional cooperative games. However, we may come across situations where some coalitional values remain unknown. This paper treats cooperative games whose coalitional values are not known completely. In the cooperative ga...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Fuzzy optimization and decision making 2016-09, Vol.15 (3), p.281-306
Main Authors: Masuya, Satoshi, Inuiguchi, Masahiro
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Artificial Intelligence
Associations
Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control
Optimization
Decision making
Fuzzy
Game theory
Games
Investigations
Mathematical analysis
Mathematical Logic and Foundations
Mathematics
Mathematics and Statistics
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Optimization
Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes
Studies
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The payoff of each coalition has been assumed to be known precisely in the conventional cooperative games. However, we may come across situations where some coalitional values remain unknown. This paper treats cooperative games whose coalitional values are not known completely. In the cooperative games it is assumed that some of coalitional values are known precisely but others remain unknown. Some complete games associated with such incomplete games are proposed. Solution concepts are studied in a special case where only values of the grand coalition and singleton coalitions are known. Through the investigations of solutions of complete games associated with the given incomplete game, we show a focal point solution suggested commonly from different viewpoints.
ISSN:1568-4539
1573-2908
DOI:10.1007/s10700-015-9229-1