Autonomy and Monitoring

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under‐explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal‐agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more d...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economics & management strategy 2016-12, Vol.25 (4), p.911-935
Main Authors: Barrenechea-méndez, Marco a., Ortín-Ángel, Pedro, Rodes, Eduardo C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Agency theory
Blue collar workers
Innovation
Innovations
Organizational behavior
Organizational behaviour
Predictions
Spain
Studies
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Summary:This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of an under‐explored consequence of granting autonomy to workers: monitoring. In the principal‐agent model that we develop, granting autonomy allows workers to carry out innovative tasks in the workplace. Given that innovative tasks are more difficult to monitor, the model predicts a positive relationship between autonomy and monitoring. Relying on information about blue‐collar workers coming from a dataset of Spanish industrial plants, we provide strong support for this prediction.
ISSN:1058-6407
1530-9134
DOI:10.1111/jems.12164