On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost

This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We pro...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Resource and energy economics 2008-05, Vol.30 (2), p.260-276
Main Authors: Böhringer, Christoph, Helm, Carsten
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
Atmospheric pollution
CGE models
Climate change
Combustion and energy production
Economic models
Emissions control
Energy
Energy economics
Energy policy
Exact sciences and technology
Fair division
General, economic and professional studies
Greenhouse gases
Methodology. Modelling
Pollution
Pollution sources. Measurement results
Resource allocation
Studies
Welfare bounds
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Summary:This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We propose to complement the competitive Walrasian solution with welfare bounds, the ethical justification of which rests on commonality of ownership. Simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model illustrate the relevance of such welfare bounds. For a wide range of initial allocations of emission entitlements – including an equal per capita allocation – we find that developing countries should be fully compensated for their emission abatement efforts, but should not receive any further transfers.
ISSN:0928-7655
1873-0221
DOI:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2007.08.004