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Mental states modulate gaze following, but not automatically

A number of authors have suggested that the computation of another person’s visual perspective occurs automatically. In the current work we examined whether perspective-taking is indeed automatic or more likely to be due to mechanisms associated with conscious control. Participants viewed everyday s...

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Published in:Cognition 2018-11, Vol.180, p.1-9
Main Authors: Kuhn, Gustav, Vacaityte, Ieva, D'Souza, Antonia D.C., Millett, Abbie C., Cole, Geoff G.
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Language:English
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container_title Cognition
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creator Kuhn, Gustav
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description A number of authors have suggested that the computation of another person’s visual perspective occurs automatically. In the current work we examined whether perspective-taking is indeed automatic or more likely to be due to mechanisms associated with conscious control. Participants viewed everyday scenes in which a single human model looked towards a target object. Importantly, the model’s view of the object was either visible or occluded by a physical barrier (e.g., briefcase). Results showed that when observers were given five seconds to freely view the scenes, eye movements were faster to fixate the object when the model could see it compared to when it was occluded. By contrast, when observers were required to rapidly discriminate a target superimposed upon the same object no such visibility effect occurred. We also employed the barrier procedure together with the most recent method (i.e., the ambiguous number paradigm) to have been employed in assessing the perspective-taking theory. Results showed that the model’s gaze facilitated responses even when this agent could not see the critical stimuli. We argue that although humans do take into account the perspective of other people this does not occur automatically.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.05.020
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Journals
subjects Ambiguity
Automaticity
Cognition & reasoning
Eye fixation
Eye movements
Gaze following
Mental states
Mind body relationship
Perspective taking
Social attention
Visibility
Visual perception
title Mental states modulate gaze following, but not automatically
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