Endogenous Political Institutions

A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and ba...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Quarterly journal of economics 2004-05, Vol.119 (2), p.565-611
Main Authors: Aghion, Philippe, Alesina, Alberto, Trebbi, Francesco
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Democracy
Economic indices
Economic models
Economic theory
Expropriation
Gross domestic product indices
Insulation
Political institutions
Political power
Political reform
Politicians
Risk aversion
Studies
Veil of ignorance
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Summary:A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice, we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.
ISSN:0033-5533
1531-4650
DOI:10.1162/0033553041382148