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When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: A model of kleptoparasitism

•Kleptoparasitism is an important animal behaviour, for which time constraints are an essential factor.•We combine evolutionary game theory and optimal foraging theory to develop a model of kleptoparastism.•We apply the recently developed game-tree methodology for games with time-constraints to this...

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Published in:Journal of theoretical biology 2020-10, Vol.502, p.110306-110306, Article 110306
Main Authors: Garay, József, Cressman, Ross, Xu, Fei, Broom, Mark, Csiszár, Villő, Móri, Tamás F.
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container_title Journal of theoretical biology
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creator Garay, József
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description •Kleptoparasitism is an important animal behaviour, for which time constraints are an essential factor.•We combine evolutionary game theory and optimal foraging theory to develop a model of kleptoparastism.•We apply the recently developed game-tree methodology for games with time-constraints to this specific problem.•Here the classical zero-one rule of optimal foraging theory does not hold. Kleptoparasitism can be considered as a game theoretical problem and a foraging tactic at the same time, so the aim of this paper is to combine the basic ideas of two research lines: evolutionary game theory and optimal foraging theory. To unify these theories, firstly, we take into account the fact that kleptoparasitism between foragers has two consequences: the interaction takes time and affects the net energy intake of both contestants. This phenomenon is modeled by a matrix game under time constraints. Secondly, we also give freedom to each forager to avoid interactions, since in optimal foraging theory foragers can ignore each food type (we have two prey types: either a prey item in possession of another predator or a free prey individual is discovered). The main question of the present paper is whether the zero-one rule of optimal foraging theory (always or never select a prey type) is valid or not, in the case where foragers interact with each other? In our foraging game we consider predators who engage in contests (contestants) and those who never do (avoiders), and in general those who play a mixture of the two strategies. Here the classical zero-one rule does not hold. Firstly, the pure avoider phenotype is never an ESS. Secondly, the pure contestant can be a strict ESS, but we show this is not necessarily so. Thirdly, we give an example when there is mixed ESS.
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subjects ESS
Food stealing
Matrix game
Time constraints
Zero-one rule
title When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: A model of kleptoparasitism
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