Serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) choices and the consequences of delaying outbreak response

• Published in: Vaccine 2023-04, Vol.41, p.A136-A141
• Main Authors: Kalkowska, Dominika A., Pallansch, Mark A., Wassilak, Steven G.F., Cochi, Stephen L., Thompson, Kimberly M.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Availability; COVID-19; COVID-19 - epidemiology; Disease Outbreaks - prevention & control; Dynamic modeling; Eradication; Global Health; Humans; Immunization; Oral poliovirus vaccine; Outbreaks; Pandemics; Polio; Poliomyelitis; Poliomyelitis - epidemiology; Poliomyelitis - prevention & control; Poliovirus; Poliovirus Vaccine, Oral; Population; Prospective Studies; Public health; Serogroup; Vaccines; Viruses
• ISSN: 0264-410X; 1873-2518
• DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.04.061

The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) faces substantial challenges with managing outbreaks of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s) in 2021. A full five years after the globally coordinated removal of serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) for use in national immunization programs, cVDPV2s did not die out. Since OPV2 cessation, responses to outbreaks caused by cVDPV2s mainly used serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) from a stockpile. A novel vaccine developed from a genetically stabilized OPV2 strain (nOPV2) promises to potentially facilitate outbreak response with lower prospective risks, although its availability and properties in the field remain uncertain. Using an established global poliovirus transmission model and building on a related analysis that characterized the impacts of disruptions in GPEI activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore the implications of trade-offs associated with delaying outbreak response to avoid using mOPV2 by waiting for nOPV2 availability (or equivalently, delayed responses waiting for national validation of meeting the criteria for nOPV2 initial use). Consistent with prior modeling, responding as quickly as possible with available mOPV2 promises to reduce the expected burden of disease in the outbreak population and to reduce the chances for the outbreak virus to spread to other areas. Delaying cVDPV2 outbreak response (e.g., modeled as no response January-June 2021) to wait for nOPV2 can considerably increase the total expected cases (e.g., by as many as 1,300 cVDPV2 cases in the African region during 2021–2023) and increases the likelihood of triggering the need to restart widescale preventive use of an OPV2-containing vaccine in national immunization programs that use OPV. Countries should respond to any cVDPV2 outbreaks quickly with rounds that achieve high coverage using any available OPV2, and plan to use nOPV2, if needed, once it becomes widely available based on evidence that it is as effective but safer in populations than mOPV2.