Water pollutant discharge permit allocation based on DEA and non-cooperative game theory

• Published in: Journal of environmental management 2022-01, Vol.302, p.113962-113962, Article 113962
• Main Authors: Xie, Qiwei, Xu, Qifan, Rao, Kaifeng, Dai, Qianzhi
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: DEA; Nash non-cooperative game; Water pollutant discharge permits allocation
• ISSN: 0301-4797; 1095-8630
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.113962

Against the background of the ecological civilization system reform in the new era, the appropriate allocation of water pollutant discharge permits is an important policy for controlling the amount of wastewater discharge. Traditional allocation methods have disadvantages, such as high additional costs, an unfair allocation scheme, and market distortion. In the present study, a fixed-cost allocation model based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the Nash non-cooperative game theory is employed to allocate water pollutant discharge permits of totally 31 provinces in China from 2008 to 2017. The allocation scheme considers environmental efficiency. The results demonstrate regional differences in the allocation of water pollutant discharge permits. The eastern region has abundant allocations. The northeastern and central regions have insufficient allocations. Besides, the western region has a significant shortage of allocations. It indicates the higher the utilization efficiency of the water pollutant discharge permits, the higher the region's sustainable development is. Based on the analysis, we propose guidelines for industrial wastewater discharge reduction. [Display omitted] •This study focuses on allocating water pollutant discharge permits through the application of DEA model based on the Nash non-cooperative game.•We propose a fair allocation scheme of water pollutant discharge permits at provincial level.•This work provides recommendations for policy-makers in order to reduce and control wastewater discharge in China.