Illusory intuitive inferences: Matching heuristics explain logical intuitions

The capacity to evaluate logical arguments intuitively is a fundamental assumption of recent dual-process theories. One observation supporting this effect is the standard conflict effect on incongruent arguments under belief instruction. Conflict arguments are evaluated less accurately than non-conf...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cognition 2023-06, Vol.235, p.105417-105417, Article 105417
Main Authors: Ghasemi, Omid, Handley, Simon J., Howarth, Stephanie
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Belief judgments
Conflict detection
Dual-process theory
Heuristics
Humans
Illusions
Intuition - physiology
Judgment - physiology
Logic
Logical intuitions
Matching heuristic
Thinking - physiology
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Summary:The capacity to evaluate logical arguments intuitively is a fundamental assumption of recent dual-process theories. One observation supporting this effect is the standard conflict effect on incongruent arguments under belief instruction. Conflict arguments are evaluated less accurately than non-conflict arguments, arguably because logic is intuitive and automatic enough to interfere with belief judgments. However, recent studies have challenged this interpretation by finding the same conflict effects when a matching heuristic cues the same response as logic, even on arguments with no logically valid structures. In this study, we test the matching heuristic hypothesis across 4 experiments (total N = 409) by manipulating the arguments propositions so that matching cues a response that is either (1) aligned or (2) misaligned with logic, or (3) cues no response at all. Consistent with the predictions of the matching heuristic, standard, reversed, and no conflict effects were found in those conditions, respectively. These results indicate that intuitively correct inferences which are assumed as evidence of logical intuitions are actually driven by a matching heuristic that cues responses aligned with logic. Alleged intuitive logic effects are reversed when the matching heuristic cues an opposing logical response or disappears when there are no matching cues. Therefore, it appears as though the operation of a matching heuristic, rather than an intuitive access to logic, drives logical intuitions.
ISSN:0010-0277
1873-7838
DOI:10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105417