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DICTATE: DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness for ad hoc networks
Securing ad hoc networks is notoriously challenging, notably due to the lack of an online infrastructure. In particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results. In this paper, we consider the case where an ad hoc network is under the responsi...
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Published in: | IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing 2005-10, Vol.2 (4), p.311-323 |
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description | Securing ad hoc networks is notoriously challenging, notably due to the lack of an online infrastructure. In particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results. In this paper, we consider the case where an ad hoc network is under the responsibility of a mother certification authority (mCA). Since the nodes can frequently be collectively isolated from the mCA (e.g., for a remote mission) but still need the access to a certification authority, the mCA preassigns a special role to several nodes (called servers) that constitute a distributed certification authority (dCA) during the isolated period. We propose a solution, called DICTATE (DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness), to manage the dCA. This solution ensures that the dCA always processes a certificate update (or query) request in a finite amount of time and that an adversary cannot forge a certificate. Moreover, it guarantees that the dCA responds to a query request with the most recent version of the queried certificate in a certain probability; this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but at the expense of higher overhead. Our contribution is twofold: 1) a set of certificate management protocols that allow trading protocol overhead for certificate freshness or the other way around, and 2) a combination of threshold and identity-based cryptosystems to guarantee the security, availability, and scalability of the certification function. We describe DICTATE in detail and, by security analysis and simulations, we show that it is robust against various attacks. |
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In particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results. In this paper, we consider the case where an ad hoc network is under the responsibility of a mother certification authority (mCA). Since the nodes can frequently be collectively isolated from the mCA (e.g., for a remote mission) but still need the access to a certification authority, the mCA preassigns a special role to several nodes (called servers) that constitute a distributed certification authority (dCA) during the isolated period. We propose a solution, called DICTATE (DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness), to manage the dCA. This solution ensures that the dCA always processes a certificate update (or query) request in a finite amount of time and that an adversary cannot forge a certificate. Moreover, it guarantees that the dCA responds to a query request with the most recent version of the queried certificate in a certain probability; this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but at the expense of higher overhead. Our contribution is twofold: 1) a set of certificate management protocols that allow trading protocol overhead for certificate freshness or the other way around, and 2) a combination of threshold and identity-based cryptosystems to guarantee the security, availability, and scalability of the certification function. We describe DICTATE in detail and, by security analysis and simulations, we show that it is robust against various attacks.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1545-5971</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1941-0018</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2005.49</identifier><identifier>CODEN: ITDSCM</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Washington: IEEE</publisher><subject>Ad hoc networks ; Analytical models ; Certification ; Communications systems ; Computer networks ; Cryptography ; Identity management systems ; Identity-based encryption ; Index Terms- Ad hoc networks ; Infrastructure ; Mathematical models ; Network security ; Network servers ; Protocol ; Protocols ; Public Key Infrastructure ; Quorum Systems ; Robustness ; Scalability ; Security ; simulations ; Statistical analysis ; Studies ; system design ; Wireless networks</subject><ispartof>IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing, 2005-10, Vol.2 (4), p.311-323</ispartof><rights>Copyright IEEE Computer Society Oct-Dec 2005</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-f0f4ba14502114599f357120d4b033196616fa7903354eb8d35519bbef66a9c3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c351t-f0f4ba14502114599f357120d4b033196616fa7903354eb8d35519bbef66a9c3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.proquest.com/docview/206522830?pq-origsite=primo$$EHTML$$P50$$Gproquest$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,11688,27924,27925,36060,36061,44363,54796</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Jun Luo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hubaux, J.-P.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Eugster, P.T.</creatorcontrib><title>DICTATE: DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness for ad hoc networks</title><title>IEEE transactions on dependable and secure computing</title><addtitle>TDSC</addtitle><description>Securing ad hoc networks is notoriously challenging, notably due to the lack of an online infrastructure. In particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results. In this paper, we consider the case where an ad hoc network is under the responsibility of a mother certification authority (mCA). Since the nodes can frequently be collectively isolated from the mCA (e.g., for a remote mission) but still need the access to a certification authority, the mCA preassigns a special role to several nodes (called servers) that constitute a distributed certification authority (dCA) during the isolated period. We propose a solution, called DICTATE (DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness), to manage the dCA. This solution ensures that the dCA always processes a certificate update (or query) request in a finite amount of time and that an adversary cannot forge a certificate. Moreover, it guarantees that the dCA responds to a query request with the most recent version of the queried certificate in a certain probability; this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but at the expense of higher overhead. Our contribution is twofold: 1) a set of certificate management protocols that allow trading protocol overhead for certificate freshness or the other way around, and 2) a combination of threshold and identity-based cryptosystems to guarantee the security, availability, and scalability of the certification function. We describe DICTATE in detail and, by security analysis and simulations, we show that it is robust against various attacks.</description><subject>Ad hoc networks</subject><subject>Analytical models</subject><subject>Certification</subject><subject>Communications systems</subject><subject>Computer networks</subject><subject>Cryptography</subject><subject>Identity management systems</subject><subject>Identity-based encryption</subject><subject>Index Terms- Ad hoc networks</subject><subject>Infrastructure</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Network security</subject><subject>Network servers</subject><subject>Protocol</subject><subject>Protocols</subject><subject>Public Key Infrastructure</subject><subject>Quorum Systems</subject><subject>Robustness</subject><subject>Scalability</subject><subject>Security</subject><subject>simulations</subject><subject>Statistical analysis</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>system design</subject><subject>Wireless 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Systems</topic><topic>Robustness</topic><topic>Scalability</topic><topic>Security</topic><topic>simulations</topic><topic>Statistical analysis</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>system design</topic><topic>Wireless networks</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Jun Luo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hubaux, J.-P.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Eugster, P.T.</creatorcontrib><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 2005-present</collection><collection>IEEE All-Society Periodicals Package (ASPP) 1998-Present</collection><collection>IEEE Xplore (Online service)</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Collection</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (PDF only)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ABI/INFORM Global (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Computing Database (Alumni 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computing</jtitle><stitle>TDSC</stitle><date>2005-10-01</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>2</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>311</spage><epage>323</epage><pages>311-323</pages><issn>1545-5971</issn><eissn>1941-0018</eissn><coden>ITDSCM</coden><abstract>Securing ad hoc networks is notoriously challenging, notably due to the lack of an online infrastructure. In particular, key management is a problem that has been addressed by many researchers but with limited results. In this paper, we consider the case where an ad hoc network is under the responsibility of a mother certification authority (mCA). Since the nodes can frequently be collectively isolated from the mCA (e.g., for a remote mission) but still need the access to a certification authority, the mCA preassigns a special role to several nodes (called servers) that constitute a distributed certification authority (dCA) during the isolated period. We propose a solution, called DICTATE (DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness), to manage the dCA. This solution ensures that the dCA always processes a certificate update (or query) request in a finite amount of time and that an adversary cannot forge a certificate. Moreover, it guarantees that the dCA responds to a query request with the most recent version of the queried certificate in a certain probability; this probability can be made arbitrarily close to 1, but at the expense of higher overhead. Our contribution is twofold: 1) a set of certificate management protocols that allow trading protocol overhead for certificate freshness or the other way around, and 2) a combination of threshold and identity-based cryptosystems to guarantee the security, availability, and scalability of the certification function. We describe DICTATE in detail and, by security analysis and simulations, we show that it is robust against various attacks.</abstract><cop>Washington</cop><pub>IEEE</pub><doi>10.1109/TDSC.2005.49</doi><tpages>13</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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subjects | Ad hoc networks Analytical models Certification Communications systems Computer networks Cryptography Identity management systems Identity-based encryption Index Terms- Ad hoc networks Infrastructure Mathematical models Network security Network servers Protocol Protocols Public Key Infrastructure Quorum Systems Robustness Scalability Security simulations Statistical analysis Studies system design Wireless networks |
title | DICTATE: DIstributed CerTification Authority with probabilisTic frEshness for ad hoc networks |
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