Social utility Functions-part II: applications

Social utilities account for agent preferences and, thus, can characterize complex interrelationships, such as cooperation, compromise, negotiation, and altruism, that can exist between agents. Satisficing game theory, which is based on social utilities, offers a framework within which to design sop...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on human-machine systems 2005-11, Vol.35 (4), p.533-543
Main Authors: Stirling, W.C., Frost, R.L.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Altruism
Applied sciences
Automotive components
Bayesian methods
Bayesian networks
Computer science
control theory
systems
Control systems
Control theory. Systems
Cybernetics
Decision making
Decision theory. Utility theory
Design engineering
Distributed control
Exact sciences and technology
Game theory
Games
Intelligent control
Intelligent systems
Multiagent systems
Negotiations
Networks
Operational research and scientific management
Operational research. Management science
Protocols
satisficing games
Simulation
Studies
Utilities
Vehicles
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Summary:Social utilities account for agent preferences and, thus, can characterize complex interrelationships, such as cooperation, compromise, negotiation, and altruism, that can exist between agents. Satisficing game theory, which is based on social utilities, offers a framework within which to design sophisticated multiagent systems. Key features of this approach are: a) an N-agent system may be represented by a 2N-dimensional Bayesian network, called a praxeic network; b) the theory accommodates a notion of situational altruism (a willingness to defer to others in a controlled way if so doing would actually benefit others under the condition that others wish to take advantage of such largesse); and c) satisficing games admits a protocol for effective negotiation between agents who, though interested in their own welfare, are also willing to give some deference to others. Three applications are presented. The first two involve well-known two-person games: the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes, and the third is a simulated uninhabited aerial vehicle scenario.
ISSN:1094-6977
2168-2291
1558-2442
2168-2305
DOI:10.1109/TSMCC.2004.843200