Bayes-Nash equilibria for mth price auctions with multiple closing times

In this paper we compute Bayes-Nash equilibria for first price single unit auctions and mth price multi unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. Thus the auctions have one or more rounds of sealed bids. We compute...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:SIGecom exchanges 2007-01, Vol.6 (2), p.27-36
Main Authors: Vetsikas, Ioannis A, Selman, Bart
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:In this paper we compute Bayes-Nash equilibria for first price single unit auctions and mth price multi unit auctions, when the auction has a set of possible closing times, one of which is chosen randomly for the auction to end at. Thus the auctions have one or more rounds of sealed bids. We compute such equilibria for a wide range of assumptions and demonstrate the method used by an agent to generate these strategies.
ISSN:1551-9031
1551-9031
DOI:10.1145/1228621.1228624