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How can governments and fishermen collaborate to participate in a fishing ban for ecological restoration?

To safeguard aquatic ecosystems and fishery resources while facilitating cooperative engagement between local governments and fishermen, an evolutionary game model featuring both stakeholders has been constructed in this study. The model examines the degree of compliance with ecological restoration...

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Published in:Journal of environmental management 2024-06, Vol.360, p.120958-120958, Article 120958
Main Authors: Sun, Yong, Sun, Zhongrui, Zhang, Yanmei, Qiao, Qin
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Sun, Zhongrui
Zhang, Yanmei
Qiao, Qin
description To safeguard aquatic ecosystems and fishery resources while facilitating cooperative engagement between local governments and fishermen, an evolutionary game model featuring both stakeholders has been constructed in this study. The model examines the degree of compliance with ecological restoration policies linked to fishing bans, as well as the adaptive strategies of different types of fishermen with varied incentives while simulating the ecological restoration policy under diverse scenarios. The findings suggest that: (1) Compliance with the fishing ban policy among fishermen is determined by their economic interests, environmental preferences, and government regulations, while its enforcement by local authorities is influenced by regulatory costs, political performance, and reputation. (2) Variations in the ecological restoration policy of fishing bans result from several factors, including punitive measures and compensation. The higher the penalty, the greater the chance of compliance among fishermen, and the higher the restoration degree of the watershed ecosystem. Conversely, the higher the compensation, the more satisfied the fishermen are with the fishing ban policy, and the smoother the transformation of their livelihoods. (3) To enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of fishing bans, it is essential to consider the interests of multiple stakeholders and adopt a coordination mechanism that facilitates the design of a reasonable and effective incentive-compatible system, thereby increasing the fairness and acceptability of the policy. This study provides a new theoretical framework and methodology applicable to ecological restoration policies for fishery closures on a global scale, accompanied by robust data support and theoretical guidance for developing and implementing fishery closure policies. •Cooperation between local governments and fishermen is crucial for safeguarding aquatic ecosystems and fishery resources.•Punishment and compensation play a significant role in the variation of ecological restoration policies for fishing bans.•A coordination mechanism that considers the interests of multiple stakeholders is essential for fishing bans.•Offers a new theoretical framework and methodology for developing and implementing fishing ban policies.
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source ScienceDirect Freedom Collection
subjects compliance
Conservation of Natural Resources
Ecological protection
ecological restoration
Ecology
Ecosystem
ecosystems
Evolutionary game
fisheries
Fisheries - legislation & jurisprudence
Fishermen
Fishing ban
Government
Humans
issues and policy
politics
stakeholders
watersheds
Yangtze river basin
title How can governments and fishermen collaborate to participate in a fishing ban for ecological restoration?
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