Security analysis of the song-mitchell authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags

In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the most efficient authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE communications letters 2009-04, Vol.13 (4), p.274-276
Main Authors: Rizomiliotis, P., Rekleitis, E., Gritzalis, S.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Access methods and protocols, osi model
Access protocols
Algorithm design and analysis
Applied sciences
Authentication
Communication system security
Computation
Cryptographic protocols
Cryptography
Data security
Exact sciences and technology
Information, signal and communications theory
Mathematical models
Monitoring
Privacy
protocol
Radio frequency identification
Radiolocalization and radionavigation
Readers
RFID tags
Security
Servers
Signal and communications theory
Tags
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
Teleprocessing networks. Isdn
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Summary:In this paper, we describe an attack against one of the most efficient authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags recently proposed by Song and Mitchell. A weak attacker, i.e. an attacker that has no access to the internal data of a tag, is able to impersonate a legitimate reader/server, and to desynchronize a tag. The attack is very efficient and has minimal computational complexity. Finally, we propose a simple solution to fix the flaw.
ISSN:1089-7798
1558-2558
DOI:10.1109/LCOMM.2009.082117