Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline?

The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological pref...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic policy 2006-10, Vol.48, p.689-740
Main Authors: Fabrizio, Stefania, Mody, Ashoka, Corsetti, Giancarlo, Temple, Jonathan R.W.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budgets
Democracy
Economic policy
Ideology
Policy studies
Political institutions
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences, but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions - mechanisms and rules of the budget process - that create checks and balances have significant value in curbing fiscal pressures even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavourable. Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishers
ISSN:0266-4658