Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2006, Vol.54 (1), p.77-94
Main Authors: Dubey, Pradeep, Haimanko, Ori, Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cournot oligopoly
Dynamic models
Economic theory
Game theory
Games of strategy
Market theory
Microeconomics
Nash equilibrium
Oligopoly
Pseudo-potential games
Strategic complements and substitutes
Studies
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123
container_end_page 94
container_issue 1
container_start_page 77
container_title Games and economic behavior
container_volume 54
creator Dubey, Pradeep
Haimanko, Ori
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
description We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36477900</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S089982560400171X</els_id><sourcerecordid>36477900</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kE1r3DAQhkVJoNtNfkBvpoec6u1Isi0rOZWQj8JCD0nOQpbGWy3-iiQv7L-P3A099JDDq2FG7zsMDyFfKWwo0OrHfrPDZsMAitRvAMQnsqIgIWeF4GdkBbWUec3K6jP5EsIeAEomYEWun6LXEXfOZGbspw57HGLI9GCzMDchujhHDN__DqYxpk-nu2ynewwX5LzVXcDL97omL_d3z7eP-fb3w6_bn9vcFDWLuW1oVeq61VVTtrZFA6U1rLFS0rqVHKUWTcsLyqS2lEFdMGpazWUpUFpGGV-Tq9PeyY-vM4aoehcMdp0ecJyD4lUhhARIxm__Gffj7Id0m6JSUCk5X0z0ZDJ-DMFjqybveu2PioJaUKq9SijVgnIZJZQp83jKeJzQ_Asg4gKiQXVQXJdFeo5JKVml4pJo0pQkhJKF-hP7tOrmtAoTsYNDr4JxOBi0zqOJyo7ug0PeADn4lB0</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>197199330</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games</title><source>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</source><source>ScienceDirect Freedom Collection</source><creator>Dubey, Pradeep ; Haimanko, Ori ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</creator><creatorcontrib>Dubey, Pradeep ; Haimanko, Ori ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</creatorcontrib><description>We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0899-8256</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1090-2473</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Duluth: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Cournot oligopoly ; Dynamic models ; Economic theory ; Game theory ; Games of strategy ; Market theory ; Microeconomics ; Nash equilibrium ; Oligopoly ; Pseudo-potential games ; Strategic complements and substitutes ; Studies</subject><ispartof>Games and economic behavior, 2006, Vol.54 (1), p.77-94</ispartof><rights>2004 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Academic Press Jan 2006</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,4010,27900,27901,27902,33200,33201</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeegamebe/v_3a54_3ay_3a2006_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a77-94.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Dubey, Pradeep</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haimanko, Ori</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</creatorcontrib><title>Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games</title><title>Games and economic behavior</title><description>We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.</description><subject>Cournot oligopoly</subject><subject>Dynamic models</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Game theory</subject><subject>Games of strategy</subject><subject>Market theory</subject><subject>Microeconomics</subject><subject>Nash equilibrium</subject><subject>Oligopoly</subject><subject>Pseudo-potential games</subject><subject>Strategic complements and substitutes</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0899-8256</issn><issn>1090-2473</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8BJ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kE1r3DAQhkVJoNtNfkBvpoec6u1Isi0rOZWQj8JCD0nOQpbGWy3-iiQv7L-P3A099JDDq2FG7zsMDyFfKWwo0OrHfrPDZsMAitRvAMQnsqIgIWeF4GdkBbWUec3K6jP5EsIeAEomYEWun6LXEXfOZGbspw57HGLI9GCzMDchujhHDN__DqYxpk-nu2ynewwX5LzVXcDL97omL_d3z7eP-fb3w6_bn9vcFDWLuW1oVeq61VVTtrZFA6U1rLFS0rqVHKUWTcsLyqS2lEFdMGpazWUpUFpGGV-Tq9PeyY-vM4aoehcMdp0ecJyD4lUhhARIxm__Gffj7Id0m6JSUCk5X0z0ZDJ-DMFjqybveu2PioJaUKq9SijVgnIZJZQp83jKeJzQ_Asg4gKiQXVQXJdFeo5JKVml4pJo0pQkhJKF-hP7tOrmtAoTsYNDr4JxOBi0zqOJyo7ug0PeADn4lB0</recordid><startdate>2006</startdate><enddate>2006</enddate><creator>Dubey, Pradeep</creator><creator>Haimanko, Ori</creator><creator>Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Academic Press</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>2006</creationdate><title>Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games</title><author>Dubey, Pradeep ; Haimanko, Ori ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Cournot oligopoly</topic><topic>Dynamic models</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Game theory</topic><topic>Games of strategy</topic><topic>Market theory</topic><topic>Microeconomics</topic><topic>Nash equilibrium</topic><topic>Oligopoly</topic><topic>Pseudo-potential games</topic><topic>Strategic complements and substitutes</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Dubey, Pradeep</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Haimanko, Ori</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Games and economic behavior</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Dubey, Pradeep</au><au>Haimanko, Ori</au><au>Zapechelnyuk, Andriy</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games</atitle><jtitle>Games and economic behavior</jtitle><date>2006</date><risdate>2006</risdate><volume>54</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>77</spage><epage>94</epage><pages>77-94</pages><issn>0899-8256</issn><eissn>1090-2473</eissn><abstract>We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.</abstract><cop>Duluth</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007</doi><tpages>18</tpages></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0899-8256
ispartof Games and economic behavior, 2006, Vol.54 (1), p.77-94
issn 0899-8256
1090-2473
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_miscellaneous_36477900
source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ScienceDirect Freedom Collection
subjects Cournot oligopoly
Dynamic models
Economic theory
Game theory
Games of strategy
Market theory
Microeconomics
Nash equilibrium
Oligopoly
Pseudo-potential games
Strategic complements and substitutes
Studies
title Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-03T11%3A12%3A23IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Strategic%20complements%20and%20substitutes,%20and%20potential%20games&rft.jtitle=Games%20and%20economic%20behavior&rft.au=Dubey,%20Pradeep&rft.date=2006&rft.volume=54&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=77&rft.epage=94&rft.pages=77-94&rft.issn=0899-8256&rft.eissn=1090-2473&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E36477900%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c482t-db165a8fa6b5fdfec05dc2bd9918f93e9a7bf34129ad1208421cfa3957e9d2123%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=197199330&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true