Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care

Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It find...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of regulatory economics 2006-05, Vol.29 (3), p.319-332
Main Authors: Zweifel, Peter, Telser, Harry, Vaterlaus, Stephan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Compensation
Consumer preferences
Consumers
Decision theory
Design
Econometrics
Economic theory
Economics
Expected utility
Expenditures
Experimental economics
Experiments
Health care
Health care policy
Health economics
Health insurance
Health maintenance organizations
HMOs
Insurance premiums
Managed care
National health insurance
Population
Preferences
Random variables
Regulation
Regulatory policy
Studies
Switzerland
Welfare measurement
Willingness to pay
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay. Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in Swiss social health insurance. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0922-680X
1573-0468
DOI:10.1007/s11149-006-7402-8