Delegation of decision rights and the winner's curse

I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2007-02, Vol.94 (2), p.163-169
Main Author: Blanes i Vidal, Jordi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Asymmetric information
Delegation
Information economics
Labour market
Organizational behaviour
Winner's curse
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Description
Summary:I show that delegating decision rights to subordinates increases their career concern incentives by making their performance more transparent and alleviating the winner's curse in the labour market.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.024