Sharing and anti-sharing in teams

An internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium. Team profit is higher under Internal Anti-Sharing than under budget-balanced Sharing, the larger the team size and the curvature of the production function, or the lower its cross-partials.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2007-09, Vol.96 (3), p.351-356
Main Authors: Kirstein, Roland, Cooter, Robert D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Budget control
Budget-breaker
Constrained efficiency
Contracts
Equilibrium
Group functioning
Productivity
Supermodularity
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Description
Summary:An internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium. Team profit is higher under Internal Anti-Sharing than under budget-balanced Sharing, the larger the team size and the curvature of the production function, or the lower its cross-partials.
ISSN:0165-1765
1873-7374
DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.009