VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION

This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing ine...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic surveys 2007-02, Vol.21 (1), p.90-109
Main Author: Borck, Rainald
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Economic models
Income inequality
Income redistribution
Income taxes
Inequality
O15
Political economy
Redistribution
Studies
Tax evasion
Voter behavior
Voting behaviour
Voting D72
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Summary:This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.
ISSN:0950-0804
1467-6419
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00265.x