The formateurs' role in government formation

Following an election, Heads of State typically choose a formateur to report back a prospective government by some deadline. If this formateur fails then another party leader is chosen on the same terms. We model this mechanism as a bargaining game, in which a single party leader has exclusive acces...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2007-06, Vol.31 (3), p.427-445
Main Authors: Seidmann, Daniel J., Winter, Eyal, Pavlov, Elan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bargaining
Deadlines
Decision theory
Democracy
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Equilibrium models
Game theory
Games
Government
Government forms
Heads of state
Mathematical models
Modeling
Negotiations
Odd numbers
Parliamentary system
Political economy
Political elites
Political parties
Politics
Proposals
State elections
Studies
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Summary:Following an election, Heads of State typically choose a formateur to report back a prospective government by some deadline. If this formateur fails then another party leader is chosen on the same terms. We model this mechanism as a bargaining game, in which a single party leader has exclusive access to the Head of State, but does not have a monopoly on making proposals. We characterize the unique equilibrium of the game in which all parties are symmetric and parties split a fixed-size pie. We also show that supra-minimal governments may form when parties are asymmetrically sized: a result consistent with the evidence on government formation in countries which use a formateur mechanism.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-006-0102-x