The gamma-core and coalition formation

This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens in Int Tax Pub Financ 2:279-293, 1995; in Int J Game Theory 26:379-401, 1997) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition f...

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Published in:International journal of game theory 2007-04, Vol.35 (4), p.539-556
Main Author: Chander, Parkash
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coalitions
Cooperation
Equilibrium
Game theory
Games of strategy
Group analysis
Mathematical methods
Mathematical models
Pessimism
Studies
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description This paper reinterprets the gamma-core (Chander and Tulkens in Int Tax Pub Financ 2:279-293, 1995; in Int J Game Theory 26:379-401, 1997) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition formation is formulated as an infinitely repeated game in which the players must choose whether to cooperate or not. It is shown that a certain equilibrium of this game corresponds to the gamma-core assumption that when a coalition forms the remaining players form singletons, and that the grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
doi_str_mv 10.1007/s00182-006-0067-9
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source International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Business Source Ultimate; EconLit with Full Text; ABI/INFORM Global; Springer Nature
subjects Coalitions
Cooperation
Equilibrium
Game theory
Games of strategy
Group analysis
Mathematical methods
Mathematical models
Pessimism
Studies
title The gamma-core and coalition formation
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