Credible collusion in a model of spatial competition

.  In a spatial model with quantity setting firms, we analyse the possibility of cooperation in a long‐term relationship, where firms compete in location. It is found that endogenizing the location decisions makes collusion more difficult.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Papers in regional science 2007-11, Vol.86 (4), p.633-642
Main Authors: Tomé, Raquel Arévalo, Chamorro-Rivas, José-María
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Cournot competition
D43
Decision theory
Game theory
L11
Modelling
Policy analysis
R12
R32
Rational choice
Regional studies
Spatial analysis
spatial competition
Supergames
Urban space
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Description
Summary:.  In a spatial model with quantity setting firms, we analyse the possibility of cooperation in a long‐term relationship, where firms compete in location. It is found that endogenizing the location decisions makes collusion more difficult.
ISSN:1056-8190
1435-5957
DOI:10.1111/j.1435-5957.2007.00138.x