The dynamic evolution of preferences

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economic theory 2007-08, Vol.32 (2), p.251-286
Main Authors: Heifetz, Aviad, Shannon, Chris, Spiegel, Yossi
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Absolute value
Altruism
Bias
Biological altruism
Competition
Dynamic models
Ecological competition
Economic analysis
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Evolution
Evolutionary economics
Game theory
Games
Logical givens
Mathematical functions
Methods
Microeconomics
Nash equilibrium
Population
Population distributions
Population dynamics
Preferences
Studies
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Summary:This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-006-0121-7